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[1f a man were in the mood to be sensual, he would be aroused
by reading the Mechanics' Lien Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Mexican law," Walker thought to himself as he saddled his horse,
"was much simpler. If you furnish lumber to a man to build his house
and he doesn't pay you, you shoot him. If he sells the house and the new
owner refuses to pay you, you shoot the new owner."2 Nonetheless,
Walker had to admit that this new law seemed logical. It made sense
that a person should get some kind of lien on a property that was built or
improved using his materials or sweat. Just that year, the California
Legislature had said so in An Act to Provide for the Lien of Mechanics
and Others.' This didn't help Walker though, because his lawyer didn't
tell him that to enforce a lien, he first had to file it with the county re-
1. This remark is attributed to former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Curtis Bok
discussing "the unnecessary pother raised by bluenoses about sex in literature." Love in Fine
Paragraphs, TIME, Oct. 19, 1962, at W6 (reviewing CURTIS BOK, MARIA (1962)).
2. This hypothetical scenario is based on the mid-nineteenth century case of Walker v.
Hauss-Hijo, 1 Cal. 183 (1850), which was one of the first cases heard by the California
Supreme Court addressing the recording of mechanics' lien claims. Violence did occasionally
ensue from property liens in frontier California. On July 4, 1865, Los Angeles County Under-
sheriff Andrew Jackson King personally served a writ of attachment on wealthy Chino rancher
Robert S. Carlisle. Carlisle threw King off his ranch and the following evening, at a wedding
reception attended by both men, Carlisle slashed King in the hand and side with a bowie knife.
At high noon the following day, King's brothers, Frank and Houston, seeking revenge, ex-
changed shots with Carlisle on Main Street in Los Angeles. The gunfight, one of the most
infamous in Los Angeles history, left both Frank King and Carlisle dead. Cecilia Rasmussen,
L.A. Scene: The City Then and Now, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1993, at B3.
3. Ch. 87, 1850 Cal. Stat. 211.
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corder. Nonetheless, because the county judge, like Walker's lawyer,
didn't seem to know about the recording requirement, Walker got his
lien even though Hauss-I-ijo had sold the building out from under him.4
But now, here he was on his way to San Francisco to appear before
the California Supreme Court, which had been formed just eight months
earlier in March 1850.5 Unfortunately for Walker, the court, citing sec-
tion seven of the recently enacted mechanics' lien law,6 reversed the San
Joaquin judge and held that because Walker had failed to record his
claim of lien with the county recorder "within 60 days of completion of
the building," Walker was not entitled to the lien.7
Such was the beginning of what is now almost 150 years of confu-
sion and misinterpretation of the California mechanics' lien recording
statutes. The mechanics' lien statutes were enacted to protect the inter-
ests of those who have provided labor or materials toward the improve-
ment of the property of others.' Yet, because of certain ambiguities
surrounding their interpretation, the statutes are now often a source of
unfairness to those they were designed to protect. 9
Today, the typical mechanics' lien claim is more likely to involve the
big-city high rise or multiple-unit housing project than the rural gold
rush era shack of Walker.10 The typical modern commercial construc-
tion project may involve any number of contractors, subcontractors, sub-
subcontractors, and material suppliers."' The claims and liens of these
4. Walker, 1 Cal. at 184.
5. See 1 Cal. v, viii (1850) (Preface).
6. An Act to Provide for the Lien of Mechanics and Others, ch. 87, § 7, 1850 Cal. Stat.
211.
7. Walker, 1 Cal. at 185-86.
8. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
9. See infra part III. As recently as the late 1950s, the California State Bar concluded
that "[flew property owners, and almost no home owners, are aware that workmen and mate-
rialmen with whom they have had no contractual relations, can get a lien on their property
... ." State Bar of Cal., Conference of State Bar Delegates, Resolution No. 70 (1958) (resolu-
tion appointing committee to study California law in regard to mechanics' liens) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
10. See MATTHEW E. MARSH, CALIFORNIA MEcHANIcs' LIEN HANDBOOK § 1.4 (Dimi-
tri K. Ilyin ed., 2d ed. 1972).
11. See 8 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA
REAL ESTATE §§ 26:6-11 (1990). A subcontractor is a contractor who contracts with the
original or general contractor, see infra note 64 and accompanying text, to provide labor or
materials for a portion of the work due under the contractor's contract with the owner. Ii
§ 26:8. A sub-subcontractor is a subcontractor who contracts with another subcontractor. Id
A supplier of materials, commonly known as a "materialman," is defined as "any person who
furnishes materials or supplies to be used or consumed in any work of improvement." Idl
§ 26:9. Skilled and unskilled laborers employed by owners, contractors, and subcontractors-
but not those employed by material suppliers-are entitled to enforce mechanics' liens for
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parties will be opposed not only by the owner of the property, but also by
the developer, lender, and title insurer.12 As a result, mechanics' lien
disputes are increasingly protracted and expensive.
1 3
While the context in which the law is applied has changed enor-
mously in the past 150 years, the statutory definition has, in many re-
spects, changed very little. When Walker was decided it was certainly a
less complicated task to gauge when "completion of the building"14 had
occurred. Yet today, the statutory language that defines the starting
point for the running of the period of limitations on the recording of a
mechanics' lien claim is no more explicitly defined than it was in 1850.'s
Between 1850 and 1971, when the present recording statutes were
enacted, there were numerous amendments to the recording statutes.16
With so much statutory history and judicial interpretation to work with,
the intent of the framers of the original and subsequent statutes has been
clouded and is now the subject of much confusion and debate. Thus, it is
often a mystery-both prospectively to the claimant with a pending
claim, and retrospectively to the courts-when a mechanics' lien claim
must be recorded to be valid.
This Comment attempts to solve the mystery surrounding the cur-
rent mechanics' lien recording statutes by providing a detailed analysis of
their historical development and modem interpretation. Part II provides
historical background into the mechanics' lien in general and the
mechanics' lien recording statutes in particular. Part III analyzes the
current recording statutes and the uncertainty surrounding their inter-
pretation. Finally, part IV briefly summarizes the major flaws in the re-
cording statutes and then proposes specific statutory revisions to cure the
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the statutes.
1 7
wages due. Id § 26:10. Architects, registered engineers, and licensed land surveyors can also
claim under the mechanics' Hen statutes. Id § 26:11.
12. See MATTHEW E. MARSH & HARRY M. MARSH, CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIEN
LAW AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PRACTICE §§ 8.1, 9.1, 9.3 (5th ed. 1990).
13. See Michael J. Bayard, How to Avoid the 10 Most Common Construction Law Errors,
L.A. LAW., Jan. 1989, at 38, 48.
14. Ch. 87, § 7, 1850 Cal. Stat. 211.
15. The present statutes require that a claim of lien be recorded within "90 days after the
completion of the work of improvement." CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115(a), 3116(a) (West 1993).
This 90-day limitation is applicable in cases where the owner has failed to record either a
notice of completion or a notice of cessation. See id. §§ 3115(b), 3116(b) (West 1993). For a
discussion of the significance of the notice of completion and notice of cessation to this analy-
sis, see infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 61 for a chronology of the session laws of these amendments.
17. Part IV is also designed to give the reader a brief summary of the detailed statutory
analysis contained in part III.
[Vol. 27:735
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Source and Scope of the Problem
The question of when a construction project is complete for pur-
poses of beginning the period of limitations18 on the recording of
mechanics' lien claims has confounded California courts, lawyers, and
laypersons for almost 150 years. The effects of this confusion are far-
reaching. Construction is stalled while lawyers engage in unnecessary
bickering over the language of a 150-year-old statute and argue the mer-
its of appellate opinions that have generally misconstrued the statute or
been misconstrued themselves.19
The large number of reported appellate-level mechanics' lien cases,2
specifically those dealing with the recording statutes,21 are themselves
proof of the extent of the problem. Some of these decisions do more to
exacerbate the ambiguity of the statutes than they do to resolve it. This
ambiguity can lead to unusual arguments at the trial court level and en-
courage claimants to make contradictory, but equally well-supported, ar-
guments. For instance, a claimant may attempt to take advantage of the
ambiguity in the law and the confusion of the courts by simultaneously
arguing that a project was completed at an early date to avoid liability to
the owner for late completion, and at a later date for purposes of ex-
tending the time for recording a mechanics' lien.2"
18. The purpose of the mechanics' lien recording statutes is to limit the period of time
claimants have to record their claims of lien. see CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3115, 3116 (West 1993).
Nonetheless, since the recording statutes "set[ ] forth a condition precedent to perfection of the
lien itself" rather than "provide for the enforcement of a pre-existing lien right," they are not
"statutes of limitation" in the technical sense of the word. Robinson v. S & S Dev., 256 Cal.
App. 2d 13, 17-18, 63 Cal. Rptr. 663, 666 (1967); see also Sanguinetti & Arnaiz Dev. Co. v. A.
Teichert & Sons, Inc., 230 Cal. Rptr. 7, 12-13 (1986) (holding that dismissal of action for
failure to record claim of lien is termination on merits and not dismissal for failure to comply
with statute of limitations) (reh'g denied and opinion ordered depublished Dec. 11, 1986).
Based on these distinctions, Civil Code § 3144, which requires a mechanics' lien claimant to
file suit to foreclose a lien within 90 days of recording the lien, is a statute of limitation. See
Robinson, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 17, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 666; Sanguinetti & Arnaiz Dev. Co., 230
Cal. Rptr. at 12-13. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of mechan-
ics' lien foreclosure and Civil Code § 3144.
19. See infra part III.
20. There are over 900 published California appellate decisions involving mechanics' liens.
Search of LEXIS, States library, Cal. file (Oct. 20, 1993).
21. See infra part III.C.
22. See, e.g., Superior Court of the State of Cal. for the County of Orange, Defendant's
Brief at 3, 23, Waterfront Constr. #1 v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., No. 657682 (July 1, 1992); see
also Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsburg Hotel Co., 96 Cal. 332, 333-34, 31 P. 164, 164-65 (1892)
(holding in one part of opinion that hotel was completed on August 2, 1889, and in another
part that hotel was never actually completed).
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While the courts themselves must bear fair responsibility for some of
the problem, misinterpretation and misapplication by practitioners and
commentators of otherwise well-reasoned decisions have led to much of
the confusion.23 The fact that appellate courts have, in recent years, is-
sued few major on-point decisions is as likely the result of a resignation
to the irreconcilability of the opposing views of the issue as it is represen-
tative of a well-settled body of law.24
One commentator has suggested another reason for the lack of deci-
sions on the completion issue:
The relative lack of litigation concerning what is actual comple-
tion, and the consequent dearth of authority, probably stems
from the fact that when an improvement is substantially com-
plete, the owner takes possession and files a notice of comple-
tion, even though some minor corrective work is required, and
lien claimants, who watch for such notices, are diligent in filing
their claim within the statutory period following the filing of
such notice.25
This analysis ignores the fact that a notice of completion is itself invalid if
filed before completion. 26 It is also questionable whether the ideal pro-
cess described here is representative of the real world of mechanics' lien
recording. If it were, there would surely be less litigation of the issue.27
This is not to say that scholars and practitioners have ignored the
subtleties of mechanics' lien law. In addition to the voluminous case law
on the subject,2" mechanics' liens and mechanics' lien enforcement have
been the subject of treatises, 29 law review articles, 30 and practitioners'
guides3" since at least the beginning of this century. Nevertheless, the
23. See, for example, the discussion of Lewis v. Hopper, 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 295 P.2d 93
(1956), infra part III.C.3.a.
24. The most recent opinions relied on by practitioners and commentators were decided in
the mid-1950s. See, eg., Lewis, 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 295 P.2d 93; Munger & Munger v.
McBratney, 131 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 866, 280 P.2d 232 (1955).
25. MELVIN B. OGDEN, CALIFORNIA REAL PROPERTY LAW § 16.23, at 610-11 (1956).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3093 (West 1993); see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See infra part III.C.
29. See, e.g., SOLOMON BLooM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MECHANICS' LIENS AND
BUILDING CONTRACTS (1910); FRANK JAMES, THE LAW OF MECHANICS' LIENS UPON REAL
PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (1900); MARSH, supra note 10; MILLER & STARR,
supra note 11.
30. See, eg., Bayard, supra note 13; Rodney Moss, Mechanic's Liens and Related Reme-
dies, 43 CAL. ST. BJ. 930 (1968); Charles E. Goulden et al., Comment, California Mechanics'
Liens, 51 CAL. L. REV. 331 (1963).
31. See, e.g., JAMES ACRET, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL (4th ed. 1990 &
Supp. 1992); CALIFORNIA MECHANICS' LIENS AND OTHER REMEDIES (Craig H. Scott ed., 2d
[Vol. 27:735
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deficiently drafted and often litigated recording statutes have never been
the focus of an in-depth analysis.32
B. Development of the Mechanics' Lien in California: History and
Policy
The current ambiguity in the mechanics' lien recording statutes is
traceable to the confusion surrounding their development in mid-nine-
teenth-century California. Unknown in the state under Mexican law,33
mechanics' lien law in frontier California "was one of institutional iner-
tia, inept draftsmanship, and technical confusion."34 The California
Supreme Court thus played an important role in "promot[ing] coherent
remedies" out of the legislation of the 1850s.35
In 1879 the California Constitution first provided for mechanics'
liens.36 Like the early constitution, the current one provides
"[m]echanics, persons furnishing materials, artisans, and laborers of
every class [with] a lien upon the property upon which they have be-
stowed labor or furnished material for the value of such labor done and
material furnished."37 This provision further requires the legislature to
ed. 1988); KENNETH C. GiBns & GORDON HuNT, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION LAW (15th
ed. 1992); GORDON HUNT, HANDLING MECHANICS' LIENS AND RELATED REMEDIES (1993);
MARSH & MARSH, supra note 12; N.B. NELSON, MEcHANIcS' LIEN LAWS AND FORMS
(1950); Arthur F. O'Leary, When is the Construction Completed?, CAL. CONSTRUCTION L.
REP., Jan. 1992, at 296.
32. A 1963 law review comment undertook an "arduous study" of the "incredibly com-
plex" California mechanics' lien statutes but neglected to include the recording statutes in its
proposals for reform and may have misconstrued the meaning of the completion
"equivalents." See Goulden et al., supra note 30, at 374.
33. GORDON M. BAKKEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN FRONTIER CALIFORNIA 93
(1985); see Macondray v. Simmons, 1 Cal. 393, 394-95 (1851). Macondray involved the claim
of a material supplier who had furnished materials prior to California's adoption of the
mechanics' lien law. Id at 393-94. The court therefore applied Mexican civil law, which did
not provide for a lien for a person who furnishes materials for the erection of a building. Id at
394-95. The facts of Macondray demonstrate the importance of such liens to material suppli-
ers and others whose labor and materials are used to construct a building. After using Macon-
dray's materials to construct his building, Simmons, the owner, conveyed the property to a
third party. Id at 393. This conveyance left Macondray without any possibility of a claim
against the property that his materials had helped construct. IA at 394.
34. BAKKEN, supra note 33, at 92. In 1854 California Supreme Court Chief Justice Mur-
ray suggested that "[n]ot only is the Mechanics' Lien Law defective, but also the Recording
Act itself." Rose v. Munie, 4 Cal. 173, 174 (1854).
35. BAKEN, supra note 33, at 92, 94. Bakken provides an informative summary of the
amounts and dispositions of mechanics' lien claims during this period. Id at 95, 98.
36. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XX, § 15.
37. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. The 1976 constitution transferred the mechanics' lien
provision from article XX (Miscellaneous Subjects), § 15 to article XIV (Labor Relations), § 3
and replaced the term "materialman" with the phrase "persons furnishing materials." Other-
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provide "for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens."' 38 In
implementing its constitutional mandate, the legislature enacted, and has
regularly amended, various mechanics' lien statutes. 39 It is currently ac-
cepted that a party who "(1)... contributes to improvement of property,
(2) at the request of the owner, a contractor, subcontractor, architect, or
other statutory agent, (3) with the intention of improving the particular
property" can claim benefits under the mechanics' lien statutes."
Mechanics' liens are created at the time the material or labor is first
provided, but the statutory remedy is not triggered until a claim on the
lien is recorded.41 While the focus of this Comment is on the recording
of mechanics' lien claims, and the statutes that limit the time for such
recording,42 it should be noted that such recording is only the first step in
the enforcement of a mechanics' lien. Unless the claimant files suit to
foreclose the lien within ninety days after the recording of the claim of
lien, "the lien automatically shall be null and void and of no further force
and effect."1
43
The California Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the
mechanics' lien statutes is to balance the rights of claimants and own-
wise the language of the mechanics' lien provisions in the 1879 and 1976 constitutions is identi-
cal. The mechanics' lien is the only constitutionally mandated creditors' remedy.
38. Id "Speedy and efficient" has been interpreted to mean that claimants' receipt of
payment and owners' clearance of title should occur "as soon as possible." Borchers Bros. v.
Buckeye Incubator Co., 59 Cal. 2d 234, 239, 379 P.2d 1, 3, 28 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699 (1963). The
California Supreme Court has also affirmed that the mechanics' lien constitutional and statu-
tory provisions do not violate the state or federal due process or takings clauses. Connolly
Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 827-28 & n.27, 553 P.2d 637, 653-54 & n.27, 132
Cal. Rptr. 477, 493-94 & n.27 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977).
39. See infra part II.C-D. With regard to mechanics' liens, the constitution is not self-
executing; the provisions must be implemented by the legislature. Borchers Bros., 59 Cal. 2d at
237, 379 P.2d at 2-3, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
40. ACRET, supra note 31, § 6.03, at 213. The term "mechanics' lien" is not separately
defined by statute. The Civil Code defines a lien as "a charge imposed in some mode other
than by a transfer in trust upon specific property by which it is made security for the perform-
ance of an act." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2872 (West 1993). As applicable to mechanics' liens, a
"mechanic" means a manual laborer. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIc-
TIONARY 1400 (3d ed. 1976). The term "mechanics" lien is thus clearly more appropriate to
the self-employed materialman or carpenter of Walker, see supra notes 2-7 and accompanying
text, than it is to today's large-scale corporate general contractor.
41. "Until the claim is perfected by compliance with the statute, it is a mere inchoate
personal right .... It has no tangible existence." 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mechanics' Liens § 62, at
134 (1978) (footnote omitted). A common issue in mechanics' lien litigation is the priority of
liens, often a dispute between a construction lender with a trust deed on the property and a
contractor or other claimant who may or may not have previously contributed labor or mate-
rial to the property. See, eg., ACRET, supra note 31, §§ 6.26-.28, 6.33. A discussion of priori-
ties in mechanics' lien claims is beyond the scope of this Comment.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115, 3116.
43. Id § 3144 (West 1993).
January 1994] TRIVIAL(?) IMPERFECTIONS
ers." Nonetheless, early cases seemed to place greater emphasis on pro-
tection of the claimant versus the interests of the owner.45 The
possibility that the early mechanics' lien recording statutes, and cases
interpreting them, placed significantly more emphasis on the protection
of powerless "[m]echanics, persons furnishing materials, artisans, and la-
borers of every class," 46 should be considered in analyzing the evolution
of the mechanics' lien recording statutes from their original codification
to their current form. 7
C. Enactment of and Early Amendments to the Recording Statutes
When it decided Walker v. Hauss-Hio,48 the California Supreme
Court was just nine months old49 and the "completion" statute had been
enacted the previous year during the first session of the newly created
California Legislature.5 The first mechanics' lien legislation was passed
on April 12, 1850.51 This was a narrow law52 that, according to one of
the first courts to apply it, gave "ample security to the mechanic and
44. "'While the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes is to protect those who
have performed labor or furnished material towards the improvement of the property of an-
other, inherent in this concept is a recognition also of the rights of the owner of the benefited
property."' Borchers Bros, 59 Cal. 2d at 239, 379 P.2d at 3, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (quoting
Alta Bldg. Material Co. v. Cameron, 202 Cal. App. 2d 299, 303-04, 20 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716
(1962)). The court based its conclusions as to the underlying policies of the mechanics' lien
statutes on the language of the California Constitution. Id. at 237, 379 P.2d at 2, 28 Cal. Rptr.
at 698.
One important consideration is that the owner and other interested parties are provided
with timely public notice of pending claims. ACRET, supra note 31, § 6.04; BLOoM, supra note
29, §§ 416, 418. Providing notice to the owner and other interested parties accomplishes the
goal of encouraging the alienability and marketability of real property. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 880.020 (West Supp. 1993) (legislative declaration of public policy underlying marketable
title legislation).
45. See, eg., Hammond Lumber Co. v. Barth Inv. Corp., 202 Cal. 606, 610, 262 P. 31, 33
(1927) (stating that trivial imperfections clause "was added to the earlier act for the benefit of
the lien claimant"); Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsburg Hotel Co., 96 Cal. 332, 338, 31 P. 164, 166
(1892) (holding that rights of lien claimants are not to be sacrificed to "the hardships which
the present lien law sometimes imposes upon the owners of buildings"); see also Industrial
Asphalt v. Garrett Corp., 180 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 1006, 226 Cal. Rptr. 17, 19 (1986) ("Ancient
authority enunciates the purpose of the mechanics' lien: to prevent unjust enrichment of a
property owner at the expense of a laborer or material supplier.").
46. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
47. See infra part III.
48. 1 Cal. 183 (1850).
49. See 1 Cal. v, viii (1850) (Preface).
50. The first legislature met December 15, 1849, in San Jose and passed, among other
matters, a lien law. Id. at vii.
51. An Act to Provide for the Lien of Mechanics and Others, ch. 87, 1850 Cal. Stat. 211.
52. BAKKEN, supra note 33, at 93.
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firnisher of materials. '5 3 The "completion" provision in this first law
provided the following:
Any person wishing to avail himself of the provisions of [a
mechanics' lien] ... shall file in the Recorder's office of the
county in which the building or wharf is situated, at any time
before the expiration of sixty days after the completion of the
building or repairs, notice of his intention to hold a lien.., for
the amount due ....
In this first mechanics' lien statute, the legislature made no attempt to
define completion. Such definitions were not included until 1887.11 The
original mechanics' lien statute was repealed, amended, supplemented,
and explained numerous times by subsequent enactments between 1850
and 1862.56
By 1862 the legislature had significantly expanded the mechanics'
lien laws regarding who could claim under them and the type of property
that could be claimed.57 Most significantly, the 1862 law differentiated
53. Walker v. Hauss-Hijo, I Cal. 183, 185 (1850). The California Supreme Court has held
that the mechanics' lien should be liberally construed to provide protection to the claimant.
See Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 826-27, 553 P.2d 637, 653, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 493 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977). On the other hand, the techni-
cal, procedural aspects of the mechanics' lien statutes, such as notice and timing requirements,
are strictly construed because they are an "extraordinary remedy, in derogation of the com-
mon law." BLOOM, supra note 29, at 21, 26-27.
54. Ch. 87, § 7, 1850 Cal. Stat. at 212.
55. See infra part III.D.I.a.
56. One commentator lists the early legislative history of the mechanics' lien law as
follows:
An Act to provide for the lien of mechanics and others passed April 12, 1850...
and-
An Act supplementary to the Act of April 12, 1850, approved May 17, 1853 ... were
repealed by-
An Act for securing liens of mechanics and others, approved April 27, 1855 ...
which act was repealed by-
An Act for securing liens to mechanics and others, approved April 19, 1856 ....
This act was explained and amended by-
An Act in addition to and explanatory of the act of April 19, 1856, approved March
4, 1857... repealed April 4, 1857 ....
An Act supplementary to the act of April 19, 1856, approved March 18, 1857 ....
An Act to amend the act of April 19, 1856 approved April 22, 1858 ....
An Act to amend the act of April 19, 1856 approved May 17, 1861 ....
1 THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 651 (Theodore H. Hittell ed., San
Francisco, H.H. Bancroft & Co. 1868) [hereinafter GENERAL LAWS]; see also BAKKEN, supra
note 33, at 93-94.
57. The legislature approved a revised and more expansive mechanics' lien statute on
April 26, 1862. An Act in Relation to Liens of Mechanics and Others, ch. 297, 1862 Cal. Stat.
384. This Act repealed and replaced all of the then-existing mechanics' lien acts. Id. § 26, at
390; see GENERAL LAWS, supra note 56, at 651.
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between the period of limitations applicable to the contractor (sixty days)
and the subcontractor or material supplier (thirty days).58
In 1872 the legislature first codified the mechanics' lien statutes in
the Code of Civil Procedure.5 9 While the suggestion by one commenta-
tor that the mechanics' lien statutes were amended in "almost every ses-
sion of the Legislature"' is an exaggeration, the statutes were amended
at least once in almost every decade between the first codification in 1872
and the transfer of all mechanics' lien statutes to the Civil Code in
1971.61
D. Present Recording Statutes
The mechanics' lien statutes are now contained in Civil Code divi-
sion 3 (Obligations), part 4 (Obligations Arising From Particular Trans-
actions), title 15 (Works of Improvement), chapters 1 (General
58. This is compared to the 60 days previously applicable to all claimants, see supra text
accompanying note 54, and the 90 days now applicable to all claimants when no notice of
completion has been recorded, see infra text accompanying notes 63, 65. The 1862 act was
amended during the 1863-1864 legislative session. Act of Apr. 1, 1864, ch. 262, 1864 Cal. Stat.
269. While no substantive change was made relevant to this analysis, the persistent fine tuning
and revision of the statute exemplifies the inability of the legislature to come up with a satisfac-
tory mechanics' lien statute.
59. An Act to Establish a Code of Civil Procedure (codified at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§§ 1183-1196). The statutes were included in the Code of Civil Procedure, regardless of the
fact that their provisions dealt primarily with substantive rights, because the legislature desired
to keep all mechanics' lien laws together. See BLOOM, supra note 29, at 5.
60. ACRET, supra note 31, at 210.
61. The mechanics' lien recording provisions were contained in Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1187 until they were moved to Code of Civil Procedure § 1193.1 in 1951, where they re-
mained until transfer to the Civil Code in 1971. The amendments to these statutes between
original codification in 1872 and transfer to the Civil Code were as follows:
Code of Civil Procedure § 1187: Act of Feb. 16, 1874, ch. 586, § 2, 1874 Cal. Stat. 410;
Act of Mar. 15, 1887, ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. 154; Act of Mar. 27, 1897, ch. 141, 1897
Cal. Stat. 202; Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316; Act of May 3, 1919, ch.
146, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 190; Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928; Act of
July 25, 1939, ch. 1068, § 1, 1939 Cal. Stat. 2994; Act of Feb. 13, 1947, ch. 28, § 1, 1947 Cal.
Stat. 510; Act of June 14, 1949, ch. 632, § 1, 1949 Cal. Stat. 1129.
Code of Civil Procedure § 1193.1: Act of July 7, 1951, ch. 1376, § 2, 1951 Cal. Stat. 3290
(codifying mechanics' lien recording provisions at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1193.1); Act of
June 30, 1955, ch. 1511, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 2749; Act of July 3, 1959, ch. 1549, § 1, 1959 Cal.
Stat. 3876; Act of June 29, 1963, ch. 1081, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 2541; Act effective Jan. 1, 1971,
ch. 1362, 1969 Cal. Stat. 2781 (repealing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1193.1).
Sections 3086, 3115, and 3116: Act effective Jan. 1, 1971, ch. 1362, 1969 Cal. Stat. 2752,
2753, 2762.
The statutory history of repealed Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1187 and 1193.1 can be
found in the historical notes to Civil Code §§ 3086, 3115, and 3116. The evolution of the
language of these statutes and the effect of the amendments on the interpretation of the current
recording statutes, Civil Code §§ 3086, 3115, and 3116, is the focus of part III infra.
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Definitions) and 2 (Mechanics' Liens).62 Two statutes in chapter 2 and
one statute in chapter 1 purport to define the length and starting point of
the periods of limitation for recording mechanics' lien claims.
Civil Code section 3115 provides limitations on both premature and
late recordation of mechanics' lien claims for original contractors:
Each original contractor, in order to enforce a lien, must record
his claim of lien after he completes his contract and before the
expiration of (a) 90 days after the completion of the work of
improvement... if no notice of completion or notice of cessa-
tion has been recorded, or (b) 60 days after recordation of a
notice of completion or notice of cessation.63
An original contractor is defined as "any contractor who has a direct
contractual relationship with the owner." 64
Section 3116 sets limitations for all claimants other than the original
contractor:
Each claimant other than an original contractor, in order to
enforce a lien, must record his claim of lien after he has ceased
furnishing labor, services, equipment, or materials, and before
the expiration of (a) 90 days after completion of the work of
improvement if no notice of completion or cessation has been
recorded, or (b) 30 days after recordation of a notice of comple-
tion or notice of cessation.65
62. Title 15 encompasses Civil Code §§ 3082-3267. "Work of Improvement" is the all-
encompassing term used in the Civil Code to include virtually any type of construction, altera-
tion, repair, or demolition project. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3106 (West 1993). The general defini-
tions in chapter 1 of title 15, §§ 3082-3106, are applicable to mechanics' liens and other
chapters in title 15. This Comment also discusses several other definitional statutes in chapter
I of title 15 as they pertain to mechanics' liens: § 3092 ("notice of cessation"), see infra note
69; § 3093 ("notice of completion"), see infra note 68; § 3095 ("original contractor"), see infra
note 64 and accompanying text.
Chapter 2 of title 15, §§ 3109-3154, contains the statutes pertaining particularly to
mechanics' liens. Certain topics found in the early mechanics' lien statutes, see supra part
II.C, are covered in the other chapters of title 15.
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3115.
64. I. § 3095 (West 1993). For a more detailed discussion of the definition of "original
contractor" and of the context within which the status becomes important, see Vaughn Mater-
ials Co. v. Security Pacific National Bank, 170 Cal. App. 3d 908, 216 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1985).
An original contractor is to be distinguished from a general contractor. A general, or prime,
contractor is a contractor who arranges for the construction of an entire project, hires subcon-
tractors, coordinates all work, and is responsible for payment to subcontractors. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 683 (6th ed. 1990). While a general contractor, by definition, will always
be an original contractor, an original contractor does not necessarily qualify as a general
contractor.
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3116.
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Section 3086 defines "completion" for purposes of mechanics' liens,
as referred to in sections 3115(a) and 3116(a), as well as other areas cov-
ered in the "Works of Improvement" chapter:
66
"Completion" means, in the case of any work of improvement
other than a public work, actual completion of the work of im-
provement. Any of the following shall be deemed equivalent to
a completion:
(a) The occupation or use of a work of improvement by
the owner, or his agent, accompanied by cessation of labor
thereon.
(b) The acceptance by the owner, or his agent, of the work
of improvement.
(c) After the commencement of a work of improvement, a
cessation of labor thereon for a continuous period of 60 days, or
a cessation of labor thereon for a continuous period of 30 days
or more if the owner files for record a notice of cessation.6 7
Under both sections 3115 and 3116, the period of limitations on re-
cording a claim of lien varies depending on whether a notice of comple-
tion 61 or a notice of cessation 69 has been recorded. If a notice of
completion or notice of cessation is recorded, the original contractor has
sixty days and other claimants thirty days from the date of recording of
66. In Eden v. Van Tine the court held that § 3086 could also be used to interpret the
meaning of substantial completion in Code of Civil Procedure § 337.15. See 83 Cal. App. 3d
879, 884-85, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218 (1978). See infra part IV.A for a discussion of the signifi-
cance of Code of Civil Procedure § 337.15 to this analysis.
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086 (West 1993). Section 3086 contains an additional paragraph,
applicable only to public projects, that is not relevant to this analysis. See id
68. Id § 3093 (West 1993). A notice of completion is a notice filed with the county re-
corder that contains a statement that the work of improvement was completed on a certain
date. Id Section 3093 specifies the requirements of content and timing of this notice. Id The
requirement of filing a notice of completion appears to have been a product of the 1897 amend-
ments to § 1187. See Act of Mar. 27, 1897, ch. 141, 1897 Cal. Stat. 202, 202-03. Between
1911 and 1951 the notice of completion was defined by statute as an equivalent to completion.
See Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316, 1317; Act of May 3, 1919, ch. 146,
§ 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 190, 191; Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928, 1928;
Act of July 25, 1939, ch. 1068, § 1, 1939 Cal. Stat. 2994, 2994; Act of Feb. 13, 1947, ch. 28,
§ 1, 1947 Cal. Stat. 510, 511; Act of June 14, 1949, ch. 632, § 1, 1949 Cal. Stat. 1129, 1129-30.
Although the notice of completion is no longer defined as a constructive equivalent to
completion, it has been held that a notice of completion serves as an owner's acceptance, and
as such is an equivalent under § 3086(b). See Eden, 83 Cal. App. 3d at 885 n.6, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 218 n.6; cf Munger & Munger v. McBratney, 131 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 866, 869, 280 P.2d
232, 233-34 (1955) (invalid notice of completion does not serve as owner's acceptance).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3092 (West 1993). A notice of cessation is a "written notice, signed
and verified by the owner or his agent," and filed with the county recorder, that contains a
statement that labor has ceased on a work of improvement. Id.
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either type of notice to record their claims of lien.70 This is in contrast to
the ninety days from completion of the work of improvement that all
claimants, including the original contractor, have to record a lien if
neither a notice of completion nor notice of cessation is filed.71
A notice of completion must be recorded within ten days after the
completion of a work of improvement.72 A notice of completion is inva-
lid if recorded before actual completion of the work of improvement,73 or
if its form does not comply with the requirements of the statute.7 4 In the
case of an invalid notice of completion, the claimant's lien recording is
controlled by the ninety-day period of limitations defined by sections
3115(a) or 3116(a) and not the shorter period defined by sections 3115(b)
or 3116(b)." Thus, the definition of completion provided by section
3086-the primary focus of this analysis-is applicable to subsections a
and b of both sections 3115 and 3116.76
III. ANALYSIS
A. Analytical Framework
Legislative histories of many California laws are inaccessible or, in
some cases, nonexistent.7 This is especially true when older statutes,
such as the mechanics' lien statutes at issue here, are involved.7 8 The
absence of a legislative history precludes any consensus of opinion on the
"completion" question and explains the need for inferential statutory
analysis. Thus, the current versions of the mechanics' lien recording
statutes79 must be examined in light of the language and policies of the
70. Id §§ 3115(b), 3116(b). The original contractor has a longer period of time to give the
owner the opportunity to withhold final payment to the original contractor until the expiration
of the period of limitations as to other claimants. ACRET, supra note 31, at 225.
71. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115(a), 3116(a).
72. Id § 3093.
73. Scott, Blake & Wynne v. Summit Ridge Estates, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 347, 357, 59
Cal. Rptr. 587, 593 (1967).
74. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3093.
75. See Globe Indem. Co. v. Hanify, 217 Cal. 721, 729-30, 20 P.2d 689, 692 (1933). The
same is true for a defective notice of cessation. See id.
76. On the other hand, the filing of a notice of cessation is not dependent on completion of
the work of improvement, and, as such, is not relevant to this analysis. For a detailed discus-
sion of the application of the notice of cessation, see Robison v. Mitchel, 159 Cal. 581, 114 P.
984 (1911). The filing of a notice of cessation should be contrasted with actual cessation of
labor for a stated period, which, under California Civil Code § 3086(c), is a constructive
equivalent to completion. See infra part III.D.4.
77. California does not publish readily available legislative records that are as complete as
the federal Congressional Record.
78. See BAKKEN, supra note 33, at 3.
79. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3086, 3115, 3116 (West 1993).
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original mechanics' lien statutes. Whatever legislative intent underlies
the statutes as initially drafted has long been diluted, either through leg-
islative misunderstanding or sloppy drafting.
This Comment proposes an interpretation of the mechanics' lien re-
cording statutes that is both consistent with their underlying policies80
and appropriate to the modem context within which they are most often
applied. This interpretation clarifies and reconciles the uncertainty and
conflicting viewpoints surrounding the statutes. The suggested interpre-
tation of the mechanics' lien recording statutes is the result of combining
existing judicial interpretation, as found in relevant appellate court deci-
sions, with a novel and exhaustive statutory analysis.
Section 3086 of the Civil Code is the culmination of more than 100
years of modifications to the statutory definition of "completion." 8
During this period numerous appellate court decisions construed the
statutes; however, none are sufficiently persuasive or on point to provide
a definitive answer to the completion question.82 Because no statutory
history exists to evidence the legislative intent, the only way to determine
the appropriate interpretation of the current mechanics' lien recording
statutes is to analyze the evolution of the language of the statutes over
several decades.
Over the years, minor changes in punctuation, sentence structure,
and paragraph formation led to significant substantive modification of
the statutes' meaning.83 The current statutes are a result of these modifi-
cations. A threshold question is whether these effects were intended or
were simply the result of sloppy drafting. In some cases the amendments
may have been inspired by judicial decisions that construed-or, in some
cases, misconstrued-prior versions of the statutes.84
Civil Code sections 3115(a) and 3116(a) both refer to the phrase
"completion of the work of improvement" as the starting point for the
period of limitations on the recording of a mechanics' lien.85 To define
the term "completion," one must turn to section 3086, which purports to
define the term.86 While the language of section 3086 is deceptively
80. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 61.
82. Nonetheless, these decisions provide valuable insight into the construction practices
and legal environment of the time.
83. See infra part III.C-D.
84. See infra part II.D.1.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 63, 65.
86. See supra text accompanying note 67. Neither § 3115 nor § 3116 refers expressly to
§ 3086. Nonetheless, for two reasons, it would be completely illogical not to refer to § 3086 to
define "completion" for purposes of §§ 3115 and 3116. First, § 3086 is contained in the defini-
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plain, application of the statute is by no means straightforward. The
analysis that follows is divided into three sections corresponding to three
separate, yet interrelated, issues: (1) the scope of the recording statutes
vis-a-vis premature and late recording,87 (2) the actual versus substantial
completion dichotomy inherent in the first sentence of section 3086,8
and (3) the completion equivalents as defined in section 3086(a), (b), and
(C).89
B. Scope of the Recording Statutes
There are two basic time limitations on the recording of a mechan-
ics' lien claim. First, a claimant may not record a lien claim until some
minimum level of work has been performed or materials provided.90 Sec-
ond, a claimant must record the lien claim within a designated period
after the occurrence of some event.91 Both of these limitations have ex-
isted since the first enactment of the California mechanics' lien statutes.92
In some cases it is not clear whether statutory amendments to the record-




Civil Code section 3115 now provides that the original contractor
cannot record a claim of lien until "after he completes his contract.
' 94
Before 19519 -- except for a brief period between 1897 and 1911 96-- the
relevant statutes did not contain any explicit limit on the premature re-
cording of an original contractor's mechanics' lien claim. During this
tions chapter of the same Civil Code title that contains §§ 3115 and 3116. See supra note 62
and accompanying text. Second, for over 100 years, prior to 1971, the substance of all three
sections was contained in a single Code of Civil Procedure section. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
87. See infra part III.B.
88. See infra part III.C.
89. See infra part III.D.
90. See, eg., Kerchoff-Cuzner Mill & Lumber Co. v. Olmstead, 85 Cal. 80, 83, 24 P. 648,
649 (1890); Schwartz v. Knight, 74 Cal. 432, 16 P. 235 (1887); Roylance v. San Luis Hotel
Co., 74 Cal. 273, 20 P. 573 (1887); Perry v. Brainard, 2 Cal. Unrep. 591, 8 P. 882 (1885).
91. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115, 3116.
92. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
93. See infra part III.B.3-4.
94. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3115.
95. See Act of July 7, 1951, ch. 1376, § 1, 1951 Cal. Stat. 3290, 3290.
96. See Act of Mar. 27, 1897, ch. 141, 1897 Cal. Stat. 202, 203 (amended by Act of May 1,
1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316). Like the current Civil Code § 3115, the 1897 version
of § 1187 precluded an original contractor from fMling a claim of lien until "after the comple-
tion of his contract." Id.
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period the only limitation on an original contractor's recording was that
the claim of lien be recorded, at the latest, within sixty days of the com-
pletion of the contract.97 This language did not preclude an original con-
tractor from recording a claim of lien before the completion of the
contract.
There is no evidence as to why the legislature removed the explicit
language limiting an original contractor's premature recording in 1911
and then replaced it in 1971. Nonetheless, the absence of such language
did not lead to any litigation involving a determination of whether a con-
tractor's claim was recorded too soon. One can only assume that both
premature and late recording were based on completion of the contract
during this period.98
b. other claimants99
Other claimants' liens are not considered premature if recorded after
they have "ceased furnishing labor, services, equipment, or materials,"
even if the project as a whole and/or the original contractor's contract
with the owner remain incomplete.c°° This individualized limitation on
premature recording has been in effect since 1911.101 Such a basis for
limiting other claimants' premature recording removed any problems of
determining whether an entire work of improvement was complete when
the other claimant recorded his or her claim of lien."0 2 Hence, the pre-
mature recording limitation in Civil Code section 3116 does not result in
significant problems of statutory. construction or practical application.
97. See Act of Mar. 15, 1887, ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. 152, 154; Act of May 1, 1911,
ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316; Act of May 3, 1919, ch. 146, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 190, 190;
Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928, 1928; Act of July 25, 1939, ch. 1068,
§ 1, 1939 Cal. Stat. 2994, 2994; Act of Feb. 13, 1947, ch. 28, § 1, 1947 Cal. Stat. 510, 510; Act
of June 14, 1949, ch. 632, § 1, 1949 Cal. Stat. 1129, 1129.
98. The requirement that an original contractor record a claim of lien "within sixty days
after the completion of his contract," see supra text accompanying note 97, does not necessar-
ily preclude recording a claim of lien before the completion of the contract. But the statute can
be interpreted that way, and that is most likely the construction given the phrase by the courts.
99. The term "other claimant(s)" as used herein refers to all claimants other than the
original contractor.
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3116.
101. See Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316.
102. Prior to 1911, other claimants could not record a claim of lien until after the comple-
tion of the project as a whole. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 16, 1874, ch. 586, § 2, 1874 Cal. Stat. 409,
410. Basing premature recording on completion of the entire project could lead to extreme
unfairness to the other claimant. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Knight, 74 Cal. 432, 434, 16 P. 235,
236 (1887) (holding material supplier's claim of lien premature when recorded before actual
completion, even if owner abandoned construction of building). In 1887 this potential for
injustice was at least partially cured by the addition of the "trivial imperfections" clause. See
infra part III.B.3.
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2. Final recording
The current mechanics' lien recording statutes require both the orig-
inal contractor and the other claimant to record a claim of lien within
ninety days after "completion of the work of improvement."' l03 Since
1850, when the legislature enacted the first mechanics' lien statute,"4 the
final date for recording a lien claim has been based on completion of the
project as a whole.105
a original contractor
In cases where neither a notice of completion nor a notice of cessa-
tion is recorded, an original contractor must record a claim of lien at the
latest "before the expiration of... 90 days after the completion of the
work of improvement."' 106 At the same time, an original contractor may
not record a claim of lien until "after he completes his contract."'10 7 In
certain circumstances the operation of these two provisions may make it
impossible for an original contractor to record a claim of lien before the
expiration of the ninety-day final recording period.
For example, "[c]ompletion of the work of improvement" 10 8 is usu-
ally defined pursuant to the substantial or constructive completion provi-
sions of Civil Code section 3086.109 Therefore, it is conceivable that an
original contractor's contract is not complete, but the work of improve-
ment is. 110 Thus, the language of section 3115 suggests that an original
contractor may not record a claim of lien if the contract is not complete,
even though the period of limitations has begun to run.11"'
b. other claimants
In cases where neither a notice of completion nor a notice of cessa-
tion is recorded, other claimants, like the original contractor, must rec-
ord a claim of lien no later than "90 days after completion of the work of
103. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115(a), 3116(a). This assumes that no notice of completion is
filed. See id. §§ 3115(b), 3116(b); supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
105. The determination of a practical definition for the term "completion" is, of course, the
primary focus of this analysis.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3115(a).
107. Id § 3115.
108. Id § 3115(a).
109. See infra part III.C-D.
110. In other words, a court could find that minor work still required to be completed
pursuant to the original contractor's contract with the owner is not significant enough to pre-
clude a determination that the work of improvement is complete for purposes of § 3086.
111. See Moss, supra note 30, at 934 ("There can be no premature recordation of the lien
except that the claimant must complete his contract before he can record his lien.").
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improvement." '12 At the same time, other claimants may not record a
lien claim until after they have "ceased furnishing labor, services, equip-
ment, or materials." '113
Similar to the situation described above with regard to the original
contractor, it is possible that a work of improvement may be considered
complete, for purposes of the substantial and constructive completion
provisions of section 3086, before the other claimant has ceased furnish-
ing labor, services, equipment, or materials. If so, the period of limita-
tions on recording a claim of lien may expire before the other claimant is
permitted to actually record the claim of lien.
3. Scope of the trivial imperfections clause
The circumstances surrounding the addition of the trivial imperfec-
tions clause reveal that the clause was designed to apply to premature, as
opposed to final, recording. The early mechanics' lien claimant was not
permitted to record a lien claim until after completion of the contract
(original contractor) or work of improvement as a whole (other claim-
ant).1 4 Therefore, a property owner could attempt to prevent a claimant
from recording a lien claim by pointing to minor, or trivial, incomple-
tions in the contract or work of improvement. 5 In 1887, in order to
avoid this possibility, the legislature added the "trivial imperfections"
clause to former Code of Civil Procedure section 1187.16
The plain language of the trivial imperfections clause also supports a
finding that the clause was intended to apply only to premature record-
ing. 17 When first added to the recording statute, the trivial imperfec-
tions clause stated that "any trivial imperfection in the said work, or in
the construction of any building, improvement, or structure.., shall not
be deemed such a lack of completion as to prevent the filing of any
lien."11 8 It is clear from this language that the provision was originally
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3116(a). It is surely insignificant that the language of § 3115(a)
refers to "the completion of the work of improvement," whereas § 3116(a) refers simply to
"completion of the work of improvement."
113. Id. § 3116.
114. See supra part III.B.1.
115. Whether or not the owner's argument would ultimately prevail in a court of law, the
owner was in a strong position to at least delay the recording of a mechanics' lien claim.
116. Act of Mar. 15, 1887, ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. 152, 155. See infra part III.C.1 for a
detailed analysis of the trivial imperfections clause and its significance to the modem statutory
definition of "completion."
117. See Hammond Lumber Co. v. Barth Inv. Corp., 202 Cal. 606, 610, 262 P. 31, 33
(1927) (holding that language of trivial imperfections clause "plainly implies" that clause en-
acted for benefit of lien claimant).
118. Ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. at 155 (emphasis added).
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intended to apply only to premature recording. If the trivial imperfec-
tions language was intended to apply to late filing, the legislature would
have used "extend" or "delay" instead of "prevent.""1 9
The underlying policies and plain language of the 1887 version of
section 1187 notwithstanding, the California Supreme Court held as
early as 1890 that the trivial imperfections and equivalents clauses ap-
plied to the measurement of late recorded, as well as prematurely re-
corded, claims of lien. 120 This interpretation is consistent with the
court's expanded view of the mechanics' lien as providing protection to
the owner as well as the claimant.
12 1
Removed from its original context, the statute appears to have de-
veloped applicability beyond that originally intended. That the trivial
imperfections and equivalents clauses were intended to deal only with
premature recording must be considered in analyzing the application of
the current statute defining completion, Civil Code section 3086, to the
final recording limitations of sections 3115 and 3116. Furthermore, any
doctrine of substantial completion implied into section 3086 that benefits
the owner at the expense of the claimant must be considered in light of
the scope of the statute as originally enacted.
4. Scope of the completion equivalents
The completion equivalents clause 122 first appeared in the same
amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 1187 as the trivial imper-
fections clause:
[I]n case of contracts, the occupation or use of the building,
improvement, or structure by the owner, or his representative,
or the acceptance by said owner or his agent .. . shall be
deemed conclusive evidence of completion; and cessation from
labor for thirty days upon any unfinished contract, or upon any
unfinished building, improvement, or structure, or the altera-
tion, addition to, or repair thereof, shall be deemed equivalent
to a completion thereof for all the purposes of this chapter.'
23
119. See, e.g., Harlan v. Stufflebeem, 87 Cal. 508, 512, 25 P. 686, 687 (1891) ("If the lien
can be 'filed' notwithstanding such imperfection, it must follow that the claimant can foreclose
his lien . . ").
120. See Kerchoff-Cuzner Mill & Lumber Co. v. Olmstead, 85 Cal. 80, 83-84, 24 P. 648,
648 (1890).
121. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
122. See infra part III.D for a detailed analysis of the completion equivalents.
123. Act of Mar. 15, 1887, ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. 152, 155. The completion
equivalents were not placed into a separate sentence until the trivial imperfections language
was removed in 1929. See Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928, 1928.
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The fact that the completion equivalents were added to section 1187
at the same time, and in the same sentence, as the trivial imperfections
language is strong evidence that the scope of the completion equivalents
is the same as that of the trivial imperfections clause. If, as suggested,
the trivial imperfections exception was added for the benefit of the lien
claimant and was intended only to affect premature recording, then the
equivalents should be construed as similarly limited.
C. Substantial Completion
The mechanics' lien claimant must record a claim of lien "before the
expiration of. . .90 days after completion of the work of improve-
ment."' 24 The language of the mechanics' lien recording statutes has
never explicitly stated that completion of a work of improvement should
be measured in terms of substantial completion. Nonetheless, since the
mid-nineteenth century, most of the courts that have interpreted the re-
cording statutes, rightly or wrongly, have inferred the doctrine of sub-
stantial completion.125
1. Trivial imperfections
The early mechanics' lien statutes provided no clue as to how "com-
pletion of any building, improvement, or structure" should be inter-
preted.126 Did the legislature intend that a building, improvement, or
structure must be absolutely and totally complete, or would partial com-
pletion be sufficient to begin the running of the period of limitations on
the recording of lien claims?
Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century courts, looking for
assistance in deciding whether minor "incompleteness" extended com-
pletion, eagerly applied the trivial imperfections language, as added to
the statute in 1887, to cases involving claims of late recording. 27 In
Amendments to § 1187 between 1887 and 1929 retained the conjunctive connection between
the trivial imperfections and equivalents clauses. See Act of May 3, 1919, ch. 146, § 1, 1919
Cal. Stat. 190, 190-91; Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316-17; Act of Mar.
27, 1897, ch. 141, 1897 Cal. Stat. 202, 204.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115(a), 3116(a).
125. See infra notes 127, 133 and accompanying text.
126. Act of Feb. 16, 1874, ch. 586, § 2, 1874 Cal. Stat. 409, 410 (emphasis added). The
1874 statute required the original contractor and other claimants to record their claims of lien
within 60 days and 30 days respectively of "completion of any building, improvement, or
structure." See id.
127. See, eg., Hammond Lumber v. Yeager, 185 Cal. 355, 358-59, 197 P. 111, 112-13
(1921) (holding that removal and replacement of defective wood-stone work in kitchen and
bathroom at cost of $35.50 is trivial and does not extend completion of residence); Coss v.
MacDonough, 111 Cal. 662, 666, 44 P. 325, 326 (1896) (holding that final construction of
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most cases the "triviality" of incomplete work was measured by compar-
ing the value of the incomplete work with the overall cost of the con-
struction project. 28 Other courts determined that trivial imperfections
should be measured with respect to the claimant's right of recovery
under the contract with the owner) 29 Thus, although it was clearly
designed to deal with premature recording only, 130 the trivial imperfec-
tions clause was embraced by courts as the first sign that substantial com-
pletion was sufficient to begin the running of the period of limitations on
the recording of a lien claim.
Although the explicit language that created an exception to the rule
against premature lien recording131 was removed from the statute in
1929,132 courts continued to infer the concept of trivial imperfections in
the statute in support of an implied doctrine of substantial completion.
133
Almost thirty years after the deletion of the trivial imperfections lan-
guage, the court in Lewis v. Hopper 134 expressly noted that it was not
elevator is trivial and does not extend completion of building costing $250,000 to construct);
Lippert v. Lasar, 4 Cal. Unrep. 74, 75-76, 33 P. 797, 798 (1893) (holding that placing door
frame in cellar addition and one-hour's work in filling small hole was trivial compared to total
cost of cellar addition of $365); Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 3 Cal.
Unrep. 700, 703, 31 P. 1128, 1129 (1892) (holding that seven dollar cost to replace "finial" and
seat in water-closet compared to total cost to construct house of $4700 was trivial so as not to
extend completion for purposes of filing lien); Shumway v. Woolwine, 84 Cal. App. 220, 225,
257 P. 898, 900 (1927) (holding that painting and decorating valued at $160 is trivial and does
not extend completion of residence costing $22,000 to build); Hubbard v. Jurian, 47 Cal. App.
543, 546-47, 190 P. 1052, 1054 (1920) (holding that touch-up painting is trivial and does not
extend completion of building costing $9222 to construct); Mott v. Wright, 43 Cal. App. 21,
27, 184 P. 517, 520 (1919) (holding that repapering of hallway at cost of $2.40 and two hours
labor is trivial and does not extend completion of fiats costing $1800 to construct).
128. See supra note 127.
129. See, eg., Bianchi v. Hughes, 124 Cal. 24, 27, 56 P. 610, 611 (1899) (holding defects not
trivial if they are "so substantial that the contractor would not have a right of recovery upon
his contract").
130. See supra part II.B.3.
131. There were three amendments to § 1187 between 1887, when the trivial imperfections
language was added, and 1929, when it was removed. See Act of May 3, 1919, ch. 146, § 1,
1919 Cal. Stat. 190; Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1316; Act of Mar. 27,
1897, ch. 141, 1897 Cal. Stat. 202. None of these amendments made any significant change to
the trivial imperfections clause. See infra part III.D for an analysis of the impact of minor
punctuation changes made by these amendments with regard to the completion equivalents.
132. Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928, 1928.
133. See, e.g., Hundley v. Marinkovich, 53 Cal. App. 2d 288, 293, 127 P.2d 600, 603 (1942)
(holding that replacement of defective parts is trivial and does not extend "completion" of
apartment house); Grettenberg v. Collman, 119 Cal. App. 7, 10-11, 5 P.2d 944, 945-46 (1931)
(holding that replacement of broken window panes, dash-coating of wall, connection of gas
and electric equipment, and cutting of lawn is trivial and does not extend completion of
residence).
134. 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 295 P.2d 93 (1956). See infra part III.C.3.a for a detailed
discussion of the significance of Lewis to modem mechanics' lien litigation.
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apparent that the absence of the "trivial imperfections" language from
later versions of the statute signaled a change in the substantive law. 135
The concept of trivial imperfections continues to appear in modem-day




Shortly after the trivial imperfections clause was added to section
1187, the California Supreme Court, in Willamette Steam Mills Lumber-
ing & Manufacturing Co. v. Los Angeles College Co.,137 provided the fol-
lowing interpretation of the statute:
In the absence of any statutory qualification or definition of the
term "completion," there would be no room for its construc-
tion by the court, but it would be construed to mean actual
completion, and would be a question of fact to be determined in
each case. The statute has, however, provided that a substan-
tial completion is all that is required in any case,... by declar-
ing that a "trivial imperfection" shall not be deemed such a
lack of completion as to prevent the filing of a lien."8
According to the court, completion of a work of improvement could thus
be either actual or substantial. There is no further-mention of the con-
cept of "actual" completion in the cases or the statutes for almost eighty
years.
Then, in 1969, the legislature transferred the mechanics' lien stat-
utes from the Code of Civil Procedure to the Civil Code,13 9 and in the
process drafted a statute dedicated solely to providing a definition of
135. Lewis, 140 Cal. App. 2d at 367, 295 P.2d at 95. In Lewis a subcontractor argued that
the timeliness of his claim should not be measured from the date of substantial completion of
the building. IM at 366-67, 295 P.2d at 95. The plaintiff based his argument, inter alia, on the
assertion that the removal of the trivial imperfections language in 1929 meant that the legisla-
ture had intended to remove the concept of substantial completion from the recording statute.
See id
136. See, eg., GIBBS & HuNT, supra note 31, § 5.3, at 74. Part of the reason for the contin-
ued vitality of the trivial imperfections concept is the large body of case law that relies on the
pre-1929 statutes containing the trivial imperfections language. See supra notes 127, 133 and
accompanying text.
137. 94 Cal. 229, 29 P. 629 (1892).
138. Id. at 237-38, 29 P. at 632 (emphasis added).
139. Act effective Jan. 1, 1971, ch. 1362, § 2, 1969 Cal. Stat. 2752, 2753, 2762 (codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086). The provisions of former Code of Civil Procedure § 1193.1 dealing
with the recording of a mechanics' lien claim were placed, for the most part, into Civil Code
§§ 3086, 3115, and 3116. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3086, 3115, 3116 with Act of June 29,
1963, ch. 1081, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 2541, 2542.
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"completion." 1" The first sentence of that statute proclaims that
"'[c]ompletion' means, in the case of any work of improvement...
actual completion of the work of improvement."14
The derivation and intended meaning of the term "actual" is uncer-
tain. In transferring the mechanics' lien statutes from the Code of Civil
Procedure to the Civil Code, the legislature stated that "[t]his act shall
not be construed to constitute a change in, but shall be construed as de-
claratory of, the preexisting law."1 42 The stated intent notwithstanding,
it is unclear of what preexisting law the term "actual completion" is
declaratory.
It is unlikely-although the language of the opinion appears to call
for such a legislative finding 143 -that the legislature based its definition
of completion on language from the 1892 Willamette Steam Mills
case."4 Nonetheless, the statement that the Civil Code statutes are to be
construed as declaratory of the preexisting law does signify that actual
completion should be construed as consistent with this preexisting law.
Unfortunately, as illustrated by the discussion of the early recording stat-
utes, both before and after deletion of the trivial imperfections clause,
145
it is in no way clear what the preexisting law was.
Black's Law Dictionary contains the following definition of the word
"actual":
[R]eal; substantial; existing presently in fact; having a valid ob-
jective existence as opposed to that which is merely theoretical
or possible. Opposed to potential, possible, virtual, theoretical,
hypothetical, or nominal. Something real, in opposition to con-
structive or speculative; something existing in act. It is used as
a legal term in contradistinction to virtual or constructive as of
possession or occupation.
1 46
This definition conflicts with the interpretation of the court in Wil-
lamette Steam Mills, in which the court contrasted actual with substan-
tial. 47 Although Willamette Steam Mills is the only case to explicitly
140. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3086 (replacing in part CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1193.1).
141. Id Such language does not appear in any of the dozen or so amendments to the
statute as it formerly existed in the Code of Civil Procedure. See supra note 61 for the session
laws corresponding to these amendments.
142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3082 (West 1993) (historical note).
143. "In the absence of any statutory qualification or definition of the term 'completion,'...
it would be construed to mean actual completion." Willamette Steam Mills Lumbering & Mfg.
Co., 94 Cal. at 237-38, 29 P. at 632.
144. See id.; supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
145. See supra part III.C.1.
146. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 34.
147. Willamette Steam Mills Lumbering & Mfg. Co., 94 Cal. at 237-38, 29 P. at 632.
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differentiate between actual and substantial completion, other cases have
been interpreted, at least by some practitioners, to require more than sub-
stantial completion to begin the running of the period of limitations on
the recording of mechanics' lien claims.14
Nonetheless, the legislative and judicial histories surrounding the re-
cording statutes suggest that actual completion should be interpreted as
substantial completion. If the inclusion of the word "actual" in Civil
Code section 3086 was intended to preclude substantial completion as a
sufficient point to initiate the running of the time for recording, then
either a century of cases was wrongly decided or the transfer of the stat-
utes to the Civil Code made a substantive change in the law, notwith-
standing legislative claims to the contrary.
149
3. Modem application
The ambiguous "actual completion" language of Civil Code section
3086, when combined with a long history of uncertain legislative intent
and inconsistent judicial interpretation, provides the modem practitioner
with the opportunity to construe the statute to best serve his or her cli-
ent. If a contractor, material supplier, or subcontractor is potentially
delinquent in recording a claim of lien, his or her lawyer can suggest a
reading of "actual" that requires total-as opposed to substantial--com-
pletion, and then argue that certain minor omissions in the construction
project preclude a finding of such completion. On the other hand, an
owner hoping to defeat a mechanics' lien claim can argue, based on an
interpretation of section 3086 that equates actual with substantial, that
the project was substantially complete more than ninety days prior to the
recording of the claim,'5 ' notwithstanding the fact that work continued,
or continues, on the project.
a Lewis v. Hopper
Because of its outcome and relative contemporaneity, Lewis v. Hop-
per 15 ' is the most popular case cited by practitioners and commentators
as standing for the proposition that minor omissions extend the time for
recording a mechanics' lien claim on what is otherwise a completed pro-
148. See infra part III.C.3.a.
149. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
150. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3115(a), 3116(a) (requiring claim of lien to be recorded 90
days after completion if no notice of completion or cessation recorded).
151. 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 295 P.2d 93 (1956).
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ject. 5 2 The minor work in Lewis was four hours of labor to install four
soap dispensers. 5 3 The installation of the soap dispensers was indeed
trivial in comparison to the construction of the entire house, and as such,
presents the ideal fact pattern for a party attempting to prove that a work
of improvement was not complete until the later performance of some
trivial work.
Reliance on Lewis as supporting a rejection of the doctrine of sub-
stantial completion in the recording statute is nonetheless difficult to sus-
tain. The Lewis court expressly stated that its holding did not turn on a
reading of the mechanics' lien limitation on action statutes; furthermore,
the court declined to overrule a substantial body of law holding that triv-
ial imperfections and other work beyond substantial completion do not
extend the time for filing mechanics' liens claims.15 4 The court's holding
was limited to the facts before it, and the court stated only that, where a
surety bond required that an action be commenced within six months
"after completion of the work described in said contract," the project
was not completed until the installation of four soap dispensers as re-
quired by the contract.-
5
Such a reading of Lewis is consistent with interpretations of its hold-
ing by the supreme courts of Hawaii and Nevada, both of which declined
to apply mechanics' lien limitation-on-action provisions to cases before
them." 6 In fact, although Lewis has been cited for its holding on the
surety bond issue, there is no record of any court in the past thirty-five
years that has cited the case for the proposition that the time for record-
ing mechanics' lien claims is extended by the performance of minor work
after substantial completion. Nonetheless, practitioners and commenta-
tors continue to cite Lewis in support of this proposition.
57
152. See, eg., ACRET, supra note 31, § 6.31, at 229; GIBBS & HuNT, supra note 31, § 8.29,
at 151; HUNT, supra note 31, at 32.
153. 140 Cal. App. 2d at 366, 295 P.2d at 94.
154. Id. at 367, 295 P.2d at 95. The court expressly noted that it was not apparent that the
removal of the "trivial imperfection" language from later versions of the statute signaled a
change in the substantive law. Id
155. Id
156. Honolulu Roofing Co. v. Felix, 426 P.2d 298, 313-14 (Haw. 1967); Commercial Stan-
dard Ins. Co. v. Tab Constr., Inc., 583 P.2d 449, 451 (Nev. 1978).
157. See, eg., ACRET, supra note 31, § 6.11; GIBBS & HUNT, supra note 31, § 8.29, at 151.
An argument against substantial completion can also be made based on the "actual comple-
tion" language in California Civil Code § 3086. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Such an argument normally would be made on behalf of mechanics' lien claimants who are
alleged to have recorded their claims too late.
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b. rationale for substantial completion
i. illogical consequences
Serious problems result from a rule of law that does not provide for
some measure of partial completion. This is especially true with regard
to today's large-scale construction projects, where minor touch-up and
maintenance work may continue for many years after initial occupancy
or use by the owner.15 In fact, "it is very seldom in any substantial
construction contract that the main construction activity just suddenly
ceases with no loose ends dangling."1 9
Ongoing litigation involving the construction of a luxury hotel pro-
vides a good example of a situation in which requiring more than sub-
stantial completion is problematic. In Waterfront Construction #1 v.
J.A. Jones Construction Co. ,10 the trial court held that a mechanics' lien
recorded by the original contractor within ninety days of the testing of
one of the new hotel's elevators was timely because such work was "pre-
scribed by the plans and specifications." '' Under the judge's reasoning
in Waterfront, if a contract calls for periodic maintenance by the contrac-
tor to continue indefinitely, a claimant may be able to record a mechan-
ics' lien claim years after actual completion of the project, arguing that
such work is called for in the plans and specifications.
162
ii. policy considerations
It remains to be decided, absent the applicability of the concept of
trivial imperfections, whether some other doctrine of substantial comple-
158. Most modem construction contracts provide for the completion of routine, ongoing
repairs and corrections to the construction project. This work is commonly described as being
on a "punch-list." Most practitioners and lawyers agree that punch-list work is post-comple-
tion and therefore does not extend the time for recording a mechanics' lien claim. Conversely,
if a task is not categorized as punch-list, the task may, arguably, be required to be completed
before the project as a whole can be considered complete. This fine distinction may create
unusual situations. For instance, if a room is inadvertently painted red when it was supposed
to be painted white, the repainting might be considered punch-list work and therefore not
prevent the project from being considered complete for purposes of beginning the running of
the period of limitations on the recording of liens. On the other hand, if the wall was not
painted at all, the incomplete job may prevent the running of the period of limitations.
159. O'Leary, supra note 31, at 298.
160. Superior Court of the State of Cal. for the County of Orange, No. 657682 (1991).
161. Id, Memorandum of Tentative Decision (Dec. 30, 1992) (citing Hammond Lumber
Co. v. Barth Inv. Corp., 202 Cal. 606, 608, 262 P. 31, 32 (1927)). Contra Coss v. MacDon-
ough, 111 Cal. 662, 666, 44 P. 325, 326 (1896) (holding that final construction of elevator does
not prevent project from being considered complete).
162. For instance, if the hotel elevator is tested annually pursuant to the construction con-
tract, the period of limitations on the recording of a mechanics' lien claim might run for as
many years as testing continues-perhaps for as long as the hotel exists.
January 1994]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tion is implied in Civil Code section 3086.163 The answer to this question
depends in part on whether the legislature, in enacting the original
mechanics' lien statutes, intended primarily to protect the claimant or
rather to balance the rights of claimants and owners.'
The doctrine of substantial completion benefits claimants by permit-
ting a claim of lien to be recorded even if the project is incomplete. 165 On
the other hand, a doctrine of substantial completion that permits the
owner to claim that a project is complete, so as to bar a claimant's re-
cording as late, benefits the owner, not the claimant. 166 Arguably, courts
that apply a doctrine of substantial completion so as to bar a claimant's
recording are frustrating the pro-claimant policies underlying mechanics'
lien law. Conversely, in many cases it would be unfair to the owner to
delay the running of the period of limitations until a work of improve-
ment is totally complete. 167
Thus, in deciding whether a doctrine of substantial completion
should be read into section 3086, the competing policy considerations
discussed above must be balanced. If the purpose of adding the "trivial
imperfection" and "equivalents" language was for the protection of the
claimant, then any doctrine of substantial completion read into the stat-
ute should be interpreted in light of this policy.
163. Some practitioners and commentators argue against any such implication based on the
purported holding of Lewis, 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 295 P.2d 93. See supra part III.C.3.a.
164. The courts' interpretation of these policy goals has varied in the 140 years since the
enactment of the original mechanics' lien laws in California. See supra notes 44-46 and ac-
companying text.
165. Since recording a lien claim is only the first step in the enforcement of a claimant's
cause of action for payment from the owner, see CAL. Civ. CODE § 3144 (West 1993); supra
note 43 and accompanying text, the claimant normally would want to record sooner rather
than later.
166. The claimant has only 90 days from completion to record a lien claim. CAL. CiV.
CODE §§ 3115(a), 3116(a). If the claim is not recorded within the 90 day period, the lien is lost
and the claimant has only an unsecured claim against the owner. It is assumed for purposes of
this discussion that neither a notice of completion nor notice of cessation has been filed; thus,
the 90 day limit applies, not the 30 or 60 day limit that would apply if either notice was filed.
See id. §§ 3115(b), 3116(b).
167. Such an action would create enormous uncertainty in the real property markets. A
buyer or lender would never know if a late claim will be held valid because of some remaining
minor defect in the project.
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D. Constructive Completion: The Completion Equivalents
Civil Code section 3086168 provides that occupation or use,169 ac-
ceptance,170 and cessation of labor 171 "shall be deemed equivalent to a
completion."'' 72 The basic concept and language of section 3086 can be
traced to the 1887 amendments to Code of Civil Procedure section
1187.173 Nonetheless, slight variations in the completion equivalents as
drafted in section 3086, when contrasted with their wording in the 1887
and subsequent amendments to section 1187, have a significant impact
on today's mechanics' lien claimant.
As with the mechanics' lien statutes in general, no legislative history
is available to explain the legislative intent underlying the amendments to
the completion equivalents. 74 Thus, it is uncertain if the subtle changes
in punctuation and paragraph structure, which gradually altered the
original meaning and context of the completion equivalents, represent
substantive legislative intent or merely sloppy drafting. This statutory
history represents a post-hoc attempt to explain the significance, or lack
thereof, of the amendments to the completion equivalents.
7
1
This section analyzes in turn each of the three completion
equivalents--occupancy or use,176 acceptance,'177 and cessation of la-
bor. 17  Because it has resulted in the most substantive alteration, the
primary focus is on the occupancy or use equivalent.
1. Statutory history of the completion equivalents
a. completion equivalents as they first appeared-1887
As their definitions first appeared in the mechanics' lien recording
statute, occupancy or use, acceptance, and cessation from labor were
each considered a separate and independent equivalent to completion:
168. See supra text accompanying note 67 for the complete text of § 3086.
169. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086(a).
170. Id § 3086(b).
171. Id § 3086(c).
172. Id § 3086. These events are herein referred to as "the completion equivalents" or "the
equivalents." The equivalents are termed "constructive" completion, Robison v. Mitchel, 159
Cal. 581, 586-87, 114 P. 984, 988 (1911), as contrasted with substantial completion, see supra
part III.C, or actual completion, see supra part III.C.2.
173. Act of Mar. 15, 1887, ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. 152.
174. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
175. While a detailed grammatical analysis of a century-old statute may appear trivial, a
proper interpretation of modem Civil Code § 3086 depends upon an analysis of the language
of the ancient statutes from which the present statute was derived.
176. See infra part III.D.2.
177. See infra part III.D.3.
178. See infra part III.D.4.
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[I]n case of contracts, the occupation or use of the building,
improvement, or structure by the owner, or his representative,
or the acceptance by said owner or his agent . . . shall be
deemed conclusive evidence of completion; and cessation from
labor for thirty days upon any unfinished contract, or upon any
unfinished building, improvement, or structure, or the altera-
tion, addition to, or repair thereof, shall be deemed equivalent
to a completion thereof for all the purposes of this chapter. 179
Occupancy and acceptance were each considered "conclusive evi-
dence of completion," whether or not accompanied by a cessation of la-
bor.18 Because of the placement of the semicolon in this clause, it is
impossible to interpret occupancy, acceptance, and cessation from labor
as anything but three separate and distinct equivalents to completion.
b. 1897 amendment to the completion equivalents
In 1897 the legislature amended section 1187 with minor change:
[I]n all cases the occupation or use of a building, improvement,
or structure, by the owner, or his representative, or the accept-
ance by said owner or his agent of said building, improvement,
or structure, and cessation from labor for thirty days upon any
contract or upon any building, improvement, or structure, or
the alteration to, or repair thereof, shall be deemed equivalent
to a completion thereof for all the purposes of this chapter. 18'1
Depending on how the sentence structure is interpreted, the
equivalents clause of section 1187, as amended in 1897, may have re-
quired a corresponding cessation of labor for thirty days if occupancy or
acceptance was to be considered an equivalent to completion.18 2 Such an
interpretation of the 1897 amendment is consistent with that given to it
by the California Supreme Court in Robison v. Mitchel.18 3
This amendment makes a separate sentence out of the clause con-
taining the trivial imperfections and equivalents language. The 1897
179. Ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. at 155. This was the second amendment to Code of Civil
Procedure § 1187, which was enacted in 1872. The equivalents were appended to the end of
the trivial imperfections clause, see supra part III.C.1, which was added to the statute by the
same amendment.
180. See Ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. at 155.
181. Act of Mar. 27, 1897, ch. 141, 1897 Cal. Stat. 202, 204.
182. See id. The rationale behind the distinction in the early versions of the statute is dis-
cussed in Willamette Steam Mills Co. v. Los Angeles College Co., 94 Cal. 229, 238-40, 129 P.
629, 632-33 (1892).
183. 159 Cal. 581, 587-88, 114 P. 984, 987 (1911) (holding that cessation of labor is re-
quired for occupancy or acceptance to be considered equivalent to completion).
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amendment also changes the scope of the occupation and acceptance
equivalents from "in ease of contracts" to "in all cases."
184
c. 1911 amendment to the completion equivalents
In 1911 a third amendment to section 1187 reworded the
equivalents clause so that cessation of labor was definitely an alternative
equivalent to occupation or acceptance:
[I]n all cases, any of the following shall be deemed equivalent to
a completion for all the purposes of this chapter: the occupa-
tion or use of a building, improvement, or structure, by the
owner, or his representative; or the acceptance by said owner or
said agent, of said building, improvement, or structure, or ces-
sation from labor for thirty days upon any contract or upon any
building, improvement or structure or the alteration, addition
to, or repair thereof .... "5
Compare this amended version with the 1897 version of section
1187, in which cessation of labor is joined with the occupancy and ac-
ceptance equivalents by "and" instead of "or."1"6 The 1911 amendment
also made the filing of a notice of completion an equivalent to comple-
tion.1 17 It is possible that this change was a reaction to an interpretation
of Code of Civil Procedure section 1187 by the supreme court that re-
quired a cessation of labor in conjunction with occupancy or use of the
work of improvement. 88
The meaning of the minor punctuation change in the 1911 version of
the equivalents clause is particularly mysterious. There appears to be no
reason to have a semicolon separating the occupation equivalent from the
acceptance equivalent, while a comma separates the acceptance
equivalent from the cessation equivalent.
d. 1919 amendment to the completion equivalents
Code of Civil Procedure section 1187 was next amended in 1919:
[I]n all cases, any of the following shall be deemed equivalent to
a completion for all the purposes of this chapter; the occupa-
tion or use of a building, improvement or structure, by the
owner, or his representative, accompanied by cessation from la-
184. Compare Ch. 141, 1897 Cal. Stat. at 204 with Ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. at 155.
185. Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1313, 1316-17 (emphasis added).
186. See supra note 181.
187. Ch. 681, § 4, 1911 Cal. Stat. at 1317. This was the case with all versions of the statute
through 1951.
188. See Robison, 159 Cal. at 587-88, 114 P. at 987.
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bor thereon; or the acceptance by the owner, or said agent, of
said building, improvement or structure; or cessation from la-
bor for thirty days .... 19
The result of the 1919 amendment was that the equivalents to com-
pletion were clearly delineated in much the same form as they appear
today in Civil Code section 3086.11 An important distinction between
the 1911 and 1919 amendments is that the 1919 version clearly required
that occupation or use be accompanied by a cessation of labor. Most
notably, cessation of labor was considered an equivalent to completion by
itself, but was also required if occupancy was to be considered a comple-
tion equivalent. 191
e. amendments to the completion equivalents between 1929 and 1969
The mechanics' lien recording statute was amended several times
between 1929 and 1969, but no significant changes were made to the
completion equivalents clause.192 Nonetheless, courts continued to mis-
construe the equivalents clause. For example, the court in Baird v. Ha-
vas 193 stated that "occupation by the owner, plus cessation of labor, or
acceptance plus cessation of labor for thirty days, shall constitute com-
pletion."194 Although it appears that occupancy required an accompany-
ing cessation of labor, it is difficult to see how the Baird court could
construe the language of section 1187 to require acceptance to be accom-
panied by a cessation of labor.195
The equivalents clauses in the 1929196 and 1939197 versions of sec-
tion 1187 are substantially the same as the 1919 version.1 98 The confu-
189. Act of May 3, 1919, ch. 146, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. 190, 190-91 (emphases added).
190. See supra text accompanying note 172.
191. Ch. 146, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. at 191.
192. See Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928, 1928; Act of July 25, 1939,
ch. 1068, § 1, 1939 Cal. Stat. 2994, 2994; Act of Feb. 13, 1947, ch. 28, § 1, 1947 Cal. Stat. 510,
511; Act of June 14, 1949, ch. 632, § 1, 1949 Cal. Stat. 1129, 1129; Act of July 7, 1951, ch.
1376, § 2, 1951 Cal. Stat. 3290, 3291; Act of June 30, 1955, ch. 1511, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 2749,
2750; Act of July 3, 1959, ch. 1549, § 1, 1959 Cal. Stat. 3876, 3877; Act of June 29, 1963, ch.
1081, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 2541, 2542; Act effective Jan. 1, 1971, ch. 1362, 1969 Cal. Stat. 2752,
2753 (adding CAL. ClV. CODE § 3086). The trivial imperfections language was removed by
the 1929 amendment, and the equivalents clause became a separate sentence. See Ch. 870, § 1,
1929 Cal. Stat. at 1928.
193. 72 Cal. App. 2d 520, 164 P.2d 952 (1946).
194. Id at 523, 164 P.2d at 953.
195. It is assumed that the court was construing the most recent amendment to Code of
Civil Procedure section 1187. See Ch. 1068, § 1, 1939 Cal. Stat. at 2994.
196. Ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. at 1928.
197. Ch. 1068, § 1, 1939 Cal. Stat. at 2994.
198. See supra note 189 for the text of the 1919 version.
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sion over the reading of the equivalents clause may account for the clear,
unmistakable delineation of the completion equivalents in Civil Code sec-
tion 3086.199
2. Occupation or use
Civil Code section 3086 clearly states that occupancy or use of a
work of improvement is only to be considered constructive completion if
"accompanied by cessation of labor thereon."'2"° There was no such re-
quirement in the original version of the equivalents clause in the 1887
amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 1187.201 The occupancy
or use with cessation of labor requirement first appeared in the 1919
amendment to section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure2 "2 and ap-
pears to be the result of a rewording of some confusing language con-
tained in the 1887,203 1897, °4 and 1911205 amendments to the statute.
Two different scenarios may explain the revisions to the equivalents
clause that took place during the early amendments to the statute. One
possibility is that the revisions were the result of sloppy drafting, in
which case the legislature did not truly intend to require that occupancy
or use be accompanied by a cessation of labor.' 6 If this was the case, the
legislature, in deciding against making any substantive changes to the
mechanics' lien statutes when transferring them to the Civil Code in
197 1,207 unwittingly propagated the misdrafted statutes of their predeces-
sors. The other possibility is that the cessation of labor language in the
present version of section 3086 is a valid representation of original legis-
lative intent.20 8 The statutory history of section 3086 makes the latter
alternative appear less likely than the former.
An explanation for the evolution of the statute is that the legislature,
in the process of attempting to clarify the unclear punctuation of prior
199. See supra text accompanying note 67.
200. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086(a).
201. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. The semicolon separating "occupancy or
use" from "cessation from labor" makes it difficult to interpret the statute as requiring occu-
pancy or use to be accompanied by a cessation of labor. See supra text accompanying note
179.
202. Ch. 146, § 1, 1919 Cal. Stat. at 190-91.
203. See supra text accompanying note 179.
204. See supra text accompanying note 181.
205. See supra text accompanying note 185.
206. Recall Chief Justice Murray's admonition about the early mechanics' lien statutes. See
supra note 34.
207. See the historical note to Civil Code § 3082 (West 1993) and text accompanying supra
note 124.
208. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3086.
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statutes, inadvertently altered the substantive meaning of the statute.
Without legislative history or judicial interpretation, it is conjectured
that the conjoining of the cessation from labor equivalent and the occu-
pation equivalent in the 1919 statute is the result of confused drafting in
the rewording of the equivalents clause that took place between 1887 and
1919.209
The Arizona mechanics' lien recording statutes, which are otherwise
very similar to California's, 210 consider occupancy alone an equivalent to
completion for purposes of the beginning of the limitation-on-actions pe-
riod.21  Although the Arizona statute limits this completion equivalent
to cases involving residential contracting,212 an Arizona Court of Ap-
peals held that under Arizona Revised Statutes section 33-993(B)(2), the
owner's partial occupation of a commercial project-a resort hotel-was
"completion" such that a material supplier's lien recorded more than
sixty days after the owner's partial occupation was untimely.2 11
In any event, the requirement that a cessation of labor accompany
occupancy does not mean that occupancy alone is not strong evidence of
completion. The cessation of labor qualification is less relevant when
only minor work is undone than when the owner occupies a work of
improvement that is only partially completed.2 4 Finally, the cessation of
labor equivalent should be interpreted in light of the general purpose of
protecting both mechanics' lien claimants and property owners.
209. One possible scenario is as follows: In the 1887 statute the occupancy equivalent ap-
plied only "in case of contracts," but no such limitation was applied to the cessation from
labor equivalent. See supra text accompanying note 179. In 1897 the legislature decided that
occupancy or use and cessation from labor (as well as acceptance) should be equivalent to
completion "in all cases." See supra text accompanying note 181. Consequently, the semico-
lon separating the occupation or use equivalent and the cessation from labor equivalent was
changed to a comma. See supra text accompanying note 181. It then became a simple matter
for a legislature, 18 years later and far removed from the circumstances that led to the 1911
amendment, to construe the 1897 statute as requiring occupancy or use to be accompanied by
a cessation from labor. Thus, when the 1919 legislature decided to completely revise the 1911
statute, see supra text accompanying note 185, and returned to the 1897 amendment for gui-
dance, it inadvertently created the joint occupancy or use and cessation of labor requirement
that survives today. See supra text accompanying note 189.
210. Compare ARIz. REy. STAT. ANN. § 33-993 (1990) with CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3086,
3093, 3115, 3116.
211. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-993(B)(2).
212. Id; see also id. § 32-1101 to 02 (1990) (defining "residential contracting").
213. Union Rock & Materials Corp. v. Scottsdale Conference Ctr., 678 P.2d 453, 456 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983).
214. See, ag., Farnham v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 Cal. App. 266, 96 P. 788





The language and interpretation of the acceptance equivalent have
not changed since it was first added to the Code of Civil Procedure in
1887.215 Acceptance as an equivalent to actual completion will most
likely arise only where an owner discharges a contractor or other claim-
ant and undertakes to finish the partially completed project him- or her-
self,216 or where the owner abandons completion of the project.
217
It is well settled that the acceptance must be such that notice is
given to all claimants that an acceptance has occurred, 2 18 and that the
statute forbids secret acceptances between the owner and original con-
tractor that defeat the claims of other claimants.21 9
4. Cessation of labor
Like the occupancy or use equivalent 220 and the acceptance
equivalent,221 the cessation of labor equivalent has been included in the
recording statutes since 1887.222 The meaning of "cessation of labor"
has not been litigated to the same extent as the definition of "comple-
tion. ' 223 This is because it is clear that the cessation of labor must be
"absolute" during the cessation period.224 It is a question of fact whether
there has been a cessation of labor for sixty days.225
The main concern with the cessation of labor equivalent is that it is
not used by owners "as a means of defrauding lien-holders. ' 226 Thus, in
Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsburg Hotel Co. 227 the supreme court held that a
215. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
216. See, eg., Ward v. Crane, 118 Cal. 676, 679, 50 P. 839, 840 (1897).
217. See, e.g., California Portland Cement Co. v. Wentworth Hotel Co., 16 Cal. App. 692,
713, 118 P. 103, 107 (1911).
218. See Munger & Munger v. McBratney, 131 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 866, 869, 280 P.2d 232,
234 (1955); Hammond Lumber Co. v. Barth Inv. Corp., 202 Cal. 606, 611-12, 262 P. 31, 33-34
(1927).
219. See Hammond Lumber, 202 Cal. at 611-12, 262 P. at 33-34; 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mechan-
ics'Liens § 75 (1978). The potential for a claimant's lack of awareness of the owner's accept-
ance is addressed infra part IV.B.
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086(a).
221. Id. § 3086(b).
222. See Ch. 137, § 3, 1887 Cal. Stat. at 155.
223. See supra part III.C.
224. Baird v. Havas, 72 Cal. App. 2d 520, 523, 164 P.2d 952, 953 (1946). The requirement
of absolute cessation avoids any potential problem of defining "substantial cessation."
225. See eg., Hundley v. Marinkovich, 53 Cal. App. 2d 288, 127 P.2d 600 (1942).
226. Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsburg Hotel Co., 96 Cal. 332, 337, 31 P. 164, 166 (1892) (The
cessation of labor equivalent "doles] not mean a mere clandestine stopping of actual work...
and then beginning it again without any indicia to the world that it had been stopped.").
227. Id.
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work stoppage of over thirty days would not begin the running of the
period of limitations if there was "no pretense that [the claimant] knew
or had any reasonable grounds for suspecting that [a painter] had let
thirty days go by at any one time without doing some work." '228
There is one noteworthy drafting problem with the present cessation
of labor completion equivalent. According to Civil Code section 3086(c),
a cessation of labor for sixty days, or thirty days if the owner records a
notice of cessation,229 "shall be deemed equivalent to a completion."230
Sections 3115(a) and 3116(a) declare that the original contractor and
other claimants have ninety days from "completion" to record a claim of
lien if a notice of cessation is not recorded.231 If a notice of cessation is
recorded, sections 3115(b) and 3116(b) control, and the original contrac-
tor and other claimants must record a lien claim within sixty and thirty
days, respectively, after the recording of the notice of cessation.23 2 Since
sections 3115(b) and 3116(b) will always control if a notice of cessation is
recorded, there is absolutely no reason for the 3086(c) cessation of labor
equivalent to account for the recording of a notice of cessation.233
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing analysis reveals three flaws in the drafting of the
mechanics' lien recording statutes-flaws that result in varying degrees
of ambiguity and potential for misinterpretation. First, the meaning of
the term "actual completion" in the first sentence of Civil Code section
3086 is inherently ambiguous and subject to contradictory interpreta-
tions.234 Second, the occupancy or use completion equivalent as defined
in section 3086(a) is the result of an uncertain statutory history and can-
not be reconciled with analogous statutes. 235 Finally, in certain circum-
stances, conflicting language in Civil Code sections 3115 and 3116 may
228. Id. at 338, 31 P. at 166. In Marble Lime the claimant was unaware of the cessation of
labor because a painter "stopped at the building all the time.... [and did not] remove[ ] his
painting material." The cessation of labor period is now 60 days. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3086(c). See infra part IV.B for a discussion of the issue of a claimant's notice of the cessa-
tion of labor.
229. A notice of cessation cannot be recorded until there has been a cessation of labor for at
least 30 days. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3092 (West 1993); supra note 69 and accompanying text.
230. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086(c).
231. I& §§ 3115(a), 3116(a).
232. Id. §§ 3115(b), 3116(b).
233. Section 3086 is only reached by way of§ 3115(a) or § 3116(a), neither of which applies
if a cessation of labor is recorded. The superfluous language should be deleted at the time of
the next revision of the mechanics' lien statutes. See infra part IV.
234. See supra part III.C.
235. See supra part III.D.2.
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operate to permanently preclude contractors or other claimants from re-
cording their claims of lien.236 As demonstrated below, each of these
flaws can be resolved through minor revisions to the relevant statutory
provisions.
A. "Substantial Completion" in the First Sentence of Civil Code
Section 3086
There is little support for the proposition that the term "actual com-
pletion" in the first sentence of Civil Code section 3086237 is intended as
an alternative to the concept of substantial completion. Although the
court in Willamette Steam Mills Lumbering & Manufacturing Co. v. Los
Angeles College Co. 2 38 seemed to hold that "actual" and "substantial"
were mutually exclusive,239 it is more likely that the use of the term "ac-
tual" is intended to be contrasted with the constructive completion
equivalents of subsections 3086(a)-(c). 24
The trivial imperfections language in former Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 1187 is further support for the proposition that the legisla-
ture intended the period of limitations on the recording of mechanics'
lien claims to begin upon substantial completion of the work of improve-
ment.24 1 Although opponents of the substantial completion concept
often rely on Lewis v. Hopper, its dicta supports the idea that the removal
of the trivial imperfections language in 1929242 did not signal a change in
the substantive law.243
There is also affirmative support for the proposition that completion
in section 3086 should be explicitly defined as "substantial completion."
Most persuasive is the fact that California law provides that the statute of
limitations on the filing of an action to recover damages due to patent or
latent construction defects begins to run upon substantial completion of
an improvement to real property.244
236. See supra part III.B.2.
237. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3086 (West 1993).
238. 94 Cal. 229, 29 P. 629 (1892).
239. Id. at 237-38, 29 P. at 632; see supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
240. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 64, at 34 (defining "actual" as
"[s]omething real, in opposition to constructive" (emphasis added)).
241. See supra part III.C.1.
242. See Act of June 19, 1929, ch. 870, § 1, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1928, 1928.
243. Lewis v. Hopper, 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 367, 295 P.2d 93, 95 (1956).
244. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 337.1(a), 337.15(a) (West 1982). These sections are, as
opposed to Civil Code §§ 3115 and 3116, statutes of limitation in the technical sense. See
supra note 18. Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that this distinction limits the trans-
ferability of the concept of substantial completion to § 3086 for purposes of defining comple-
tion as used in §§ 3115 and 3116.
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Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1, enacted in 1967,245 requires
that an action for damages due to patent defects in an improvement to
real property be filed within four years from substantial completion of
the improvement. 2 6 Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15, enacted in
1971,247 requires that an action for damages due to latent defects be filed
within ten years from substantial completion of the improvement. 248 The
use of the substantial completion language in these two statutes appears
to have avoided the problems that have plagued the mechanics' lien re-
cording statutes as a result of the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of
the terms "completion" or "actual completion.
'249
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for parties to construction con-
tracts to define completion as substantial completion. For instance, in
construction contracts that incorporate the American Institute of Archi-
tects (AIA) form, which sets forth certain uniform standards, "substan-
tial completion" for breach of contract and mechanics' lien claim issues
is defined as "the stage in the progress of the Work when the Work or
designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete in accordance with the
Contract Documents so the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for its
intended use."' 2 0 Finally, it should be noted that parties to construction
contracts-perhaps in response to the confusion surrounding completion
as defined by Civil Code section 3086-often establish their own defini-
tion of completion for other purposes, such as establishing the point at
which liquidated damages begin to accrue.25 l
Therefore, to avoid any further confusion over the intended meaning
of the first sentence of Civil Code section 3086, the legislature should
redraft the sentence to read: "'Completion' means, in the case of any
work of improvement other than a public work, substantial completion
245. Act of Aug. 23, 1967, ch. 1326, § 1, 1967 Cal. Stat. 3157.
246. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.1(a).
247. Act of Nov. 17, 1971, ch. 1569, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 3148.
248. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15(a).
249. There are less than 75 reported cases in which § 337.1 or § 337.15 was litigated.
Search of LEXIS, States library, Cal file (Oct. 20, 1993). Admittedly the mechanics' lien re-
cording statutes have a 100-year head start on the construction defect statutes. On the other
hand, this head start may be evened out by the exponential increase in litigation in general over
the last 20 years.
250. AMERICAN INST. OF ARCHITECTS, GENERAL CONDITIONS o THE CONTRACT FOR
CONSTRUCTION 9.8.1 (14th ed. 1987) (Document A201). It should be noted that any such
contractual definition of completion agreed to between an owner and original contractor is not
necessarily binding on other claimants; they may still be required to refer to the statutory
definition of completion.
251. See O'Leary, supra note 31, at 296. The Civil Code permits parties to waive code
provisions, including those applying to mechanics' liens, unless such waiver would be against
public policy. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3268 (West 1993).
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of the work of improvement."2" 2 This simple-but definitely not triv-
ial-amendment would finally make explicit what the legislature has
most certainly always intended.
B. Cessation of Labor Requirement in Civil Code Section 3086(a)
The requirement in Civil Code section 3086(a) that occupancy or
use be accompanied by a cessation of labor is difficult to reconcile with
statutory history25 3 or recent legislation. As noted, the Arizona mechan-
ics' lien recording statute does not require occupancy or use, as a con-
structive equivalent to completion, to be accompanied by a cessation of
labor.25 4 Even more persuasive is the fact that the California Legislature
has itself deemed occupation or use, without an accompanying cessation
of labor, to be sufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations
on the filing of an action to recover damages due to latent construction
defects.255
Legislative history and statutory analogy notwithstanding, the lien
claimant may be better protected by including the cessation of labor re-
quirement with the occupancy or use completion equivalent. If the ces-
sation of labor requirement is included, the claimant can determine if
labor is continuing on a project through simple observation of the work-
site. Since occupancy and use are neither publicly recorded nor plainly
visible, if the cessation of labor requirement is not included, the claim-
ant--especially one that has completed his or her contribution to the
project-may not have reason to know that the owner or his agent has
begun to occupy or use the work of improvement. In such cases the
period of limitations on a claimant's lien recording will begin to run
without notice to the claimant.
252. There is no need to further define completion as "actual" completion to distinguish the
constructive completion equivalents. The distinction between the proposed "substantial com-
pletion" concept in the first sentence of § 3086 and the constructive aspect of the completion
equivalents will be sufficiently clear.
253. See supra part III.D.
254. See supra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
255. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15(g)(3) (West 1982). The occupancy or use
equivalent, without the requirement of an accompanying cessation of labor, was added to the
Arizona statute in 1979. See Act of May 2, 1979, ch. 202, § 3, 1979 Ariz. Sess. Laws 776.
Perhaps the California Legislature was influenced by the language of the Arizona mechanics'
lien recording statute when it decided not to require an accompanying cessation of labor with
Code of Civil Procedure § 337.15(g)(3). See Act of June 23, 1981, ch. 88, § 1, 1981 Cal. Stat.
204. If so, it certainly follows that the cessation of labor requirement should be removed from
Civil Code § 3086(a).
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If it is true that the mechanics' lien statutes are designed primarily
for the protection of the claimant,2" 6 then the present Civil Code section
3086(a) requirement that a cessation of labor accompany the occupancy
or use requirement is completely appropriate. However, it must be noted
that the rationale for requiring a cessation of labor with the occupancy or
use equivalent is equally applicable to the "acceptance" equivalent stated
in section 3086(b).25 7 Yet, the legislature chose to deem acceptance by
the owner or his agent to be equivalent to completion without any re-
quirement of a cessation of labor.2"' Therefore, in order to maintain con-
sistency among the completion equivalents stated in Civil Code section
3086, the acceptance equivalent should be revised to require an accompa-
nying cessation of labor.25 9
C. Potential Conflict Between the Limitations on Premature and Final
Recording
Under certain circumstances2 ° Civil Code sections 3115 and 3116
can operate so that the period of limitations on the recording of a lien
will expire before the original contractor or other claimant is permitted
to actually record a claim of lien.2 61 It goes without saying that such a
result is inconsistent with the claimant-oriented policies underlying the
mechanics' lien.262
In the case of the original contractor, it is entirely possible for a
contractor's contract to remain partially executory for the ninety-day
limitations period following substantial completion of the work of im-
provement as a whole. Nonetheless, such a result-although conceivable
under the language of section 3115-is unlikely to occur in practice. If a
work of improvement is held to be substantially complete, a reasonable
court will apply the doctrine of substantial performance and hold that
the contract between the owner and original contractor is likewise sub-
stantially complete.263
256. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
257. The claimant is probably less likely to be aware of an acceptance by the owner than of
the owner's occupancy or use.
258. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3086(b).
259. If the legislature decides, based on the analysis of the statutory history of the comple-
tion equivalents, see supra part HII.D, that occupancy or use need not be accompanied by a
cessation of labor, the acceptance equivalent should not be revised.
260. This discussion assumes that the concept of substantial completion is read into the first
sentence of Civil Code § 3086 as recommended supra part IV.A.
261. See supra part III.B.2.
262. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
263. See, eg., Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
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The conflict between the premature and final recording provisions in
Civil Code section 3116 may also lead to situations where the work of
improvement is substantially completed prior to the time that the claim-
ant "has ceased furnishing labor, services, equipment, or materials." 264
Nonetheless, as is the case with the original contractor under section
3115, such a result is unlikely. If additional labor or material is required
to be provided to a substantially complete work of improvement-upon
which the ninety-day period of limitations has begun to run-the subcon-
tractor or material supplier can avoid forfeiture of the right to record a
lien by recording a claim of lien for the amount of materials or labor
provided up until that time.
Notwithstanding these observations, in order to avoid even the po-
tential for the harsh, unintended results which the language of Civil Code
sections 3115 and 3116 invites, the aforementioned statutes should be
revised 265 to account for situations where substantial completion of a
work of improvement occurs before the original contractor "completes
his contract ' 26 6 or before the other claimant "has ceased furnishing la-
bor, services, equipment, or materials. '2 67 The amended statutes would
read as follows:
§ 3115. Original contractor; recordation of claim; time
Each original contractor, in order to enforce a lien, must
record his claim of lien after he completes his contract and
before the expiration of (a) 90 days after either the completion
of the work of improvementl268] or the completion of his con-
tract, whichever occurs later, if no notice of completion or no-
tice of cessation has been recorded, or (b) 60 days after
recordation of a notice of completion or notice of cessation.
§ 3116. Other claimants; recordation of claim; time
Each claimant other than an original contractor, in order
to enforce a lien, must record his claim of lien after he has
ceased furnishing labor, services, equipment, or materials, and
before the expiration of (a) 90 days after either the [2691 comple-
264. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3116.
265. If the more imperative revisions recommended supra part IV.A-B are implemented, it
should be a minor task for the legislature to include the proposed revisions to §§ 3115 and
3116 as part of the same bill.
266. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3115.
267. IdL § 3116.
268. The phrase "as defined in Section 3106" that follows the term "work of improvement"
in § 3115(a) should also be deleted. This language complicates the reading of the statute and is
unnecessary. The phrase does not appear in § 3116(a).
269. This word is added for consistency with the language of § 3115(a). See supra note 112.
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tion of the work of improvement or after he has ceased furnish-
ing labor, services, equipment, or materials, whichever occurs
later, if no notice of completion or cessation has been recorded,
or (b) 30 days after recordation of a notice of completion or
notice of cessation. °
V. CONCLUSION
In the mid-nineteenth century, before the enactment of the first
mechanics' lien law, a dispute over real property might be resolved in a
shootout on main street.271 Today, the law itself is all too often the cause
of needless courtroom showdowns: the wild-west gunslinger replaced by
the high-priced construction lawyer. The current California Civil Code
statutes pertaining to the recording of mechanics' lien claims embody a
legacy of legislative inattentiveness, judicial misinterpretation, and prac-
tical confusion. The California Constitution mandates that the legisla-
ture provide for the "speedy and efficient enforcement" of mechanics'
liens.272 The extent of mechanics' lien litigation since the late nineteenth
century suggests that, at least with regard to the recording statutes, the
legislature has failed to carry out its constitutional mandate.
Inherent ambiguity in the language of the recording statutes has
been exacerbated by inconsistent judicial interpretation. Some courts
made valiant efforts to interpret the statutes in light of original policies
underlying the statutes. But, as the years went by, courts became in-
creasingly less willing to wade into the morass that is the legislative and
statutory history of the statutes. The ambiguous and poorly defined lan-
guage in the current recording statutes forces today's mechanics' lien liti-
gants to choose between "reinventing the wheel" and relying on popular
case authority that only long ago--or, in some cases, never-had any
relevance to typical circumstances. Continued reliance on inapposite
cases such as Lewis v. Hopper 273 is representative of the uncertain state of
the mechanics' lien recording law.
Implementation of the recommendations contained in this Com-
ment would save litigants, courts, and laypersons the need to continually
reevaluate 150 years of statutory and judicial disarray. It is only proper
that all those involved in the contribution of labor, materials, and money
270. The proposed additional language in both statutes is in italics. It is also recommended
that existing male-oriented language in §§ 3115, 3116, and 3086 be gender-neutralized.
271. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
272. CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
273. 140 Cal. App. 2d 365, 295 P.2d 93 (1956); see supra part III.C.3.a.
[Vol. 27:735
TRIVIAL(?) IMPERFECTIONS
to the development of property in California are afforded the legal pro-
tection the state constitution mandates.
Craig Penner Bronstein*
* I wish to thank Howard B. Brown (Brown & Brown, Los Angeles) without whose
guidance this paper, from conception to final revision, would not have been possible. I also
wish to acknowledge the love and support of my mother, my father, and my brothers and
sister. I dedicate this Comment to my fianc6e Emily Irene Wilson.
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